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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the demand for attendance at National Football League (NFL) games using 
a rational addiction model to test the hypothesis that professional football displays the properties 
of a habit-forming good.  Rational addiction theory suggests that past and future consumption 
play a part in determining the current period’s consumption for habit-forming goods.  
Additionally, we postulate the behavioral implications of profit-maximizing ticket pricing behavior 
by NFL teams.  Previous studies have been unable to detect pricing power by NFL teams.  Our 
model of pricing power allows us to identify theoretically- anticipated pricing behavior.  A pooled 
data set is collected using statistics from each NFL team from the 1983 to the 2008 seasons.  
Current attendance is modeled as a function of team specific variables, including past and future 
attendance, ticket price, and team performance.  The model is estimated using Two-Stage Least 
Squares (2SLS).  We also treat the censored nature of ticket demand as NFL teams frequently 
experience sell-outs.  It is found that past and future attendance, winning percentage, the age of 
the stadium in which a team plays, and own-price demand elasticity influence attendance.  The 
fact that coefficients for past and future attendance are positive and significant in this analysis 
lends support to the notion that NFL fans display characteristics of rational addiction in their 
consumption behavior.  Further, we find evidence to support profit-maximizing behavior in ticket 
sales. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
n 2002, National Football League (NFL) attendance totaled 16,931,340, with an average attendance per 
game of 66,138.  As illustrated in Figure 1, attendance figures have been on the rise since these statistics 
were first made available.  In the NFL, ticket revenues account for nearly one-third of all revenues, 
making attendance quite important to the league.
1
  Football fans spend substantial amounts of time and money when 
they attend an NFL game.  According to the Fan Cost Index calculated by Team Marketing Report, the average fan 
spends anywhere from near $200 in Atlanta to over $400 in New England when they go to a game.  Furthermore, the 
NFL boasts more fans than any other professional sport in the United States.  Over half of all Americans claim to 
follow the league.  Why is it that that the NFL is so popular and why is its popularity growing over time?  Is it 
possible that football fans exhibit characteristics of habit-formation in their behavior?  This paper will try to answer 
such questions by examining NFL attendance using a model of rational addiction. 
 
While addiction is often used to explain a physical dependency on substances, such as alcohol and 
cigarettes, rational choice theory can explain addictive behavior as it pertains to a much broader array of activities.  
People can become addicted to any number of things, from food to exercise to work.  According to Becker and 
Murphy (1988), rational addiction theory suggests that people make choices according to their consistent utility 
maximization plan.  This would mean that past consumption and estimated future consumption have an effect on 
                                                 
1Rick Horrow, “The NFL Juggernaut at Postseason, Part I,” available from http://cbs.sportsline.com/general/story/7003559, 
accessed February 1, 2004. 
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present consumption for addictive goods.  If NFL attendance is habit-forming, then it can be shown that past 
attendance and estimated future attendance are significant factors that affect present attendance at NFL football 
games.  If, on the other hand, past and estimated future attendance do not affect current attendance, then the notion 
of habit-formation will be called into question. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Average NFL Attendance (1934-2002) 
Source: NFL Record and Fact Book 
 
 
This paper will proceed as follows.  The following section will discuss the relevant literature on the topics 
of attendance at professional sporting events and the theory of rational addiction.  The next section will present the 
empirical model and methodology.  The fourth section will report the results of the regression analysis.  The final 
section will discuss conclusions, along with any caveats encountered, and outline some directions for future 
research. 
 
CURRENT RESEARCH ON ATTENDANCE AND RATIONAL ADDICTION 
 
There have been a number of studies in the economics literature on factors that influence the consumption 
of sports, which is generally represented by spectator attendance at sporting events.  Economic demand models have 
been widely used to analyze the factors that determine spectator attendance, and this method has been applied to 
various sports.  A summary of such literature follows.  Downward and Dawson (2000) contains an excellent 
overview of sports related demand analysis studies. 
 
Baseball attendance has been widely investigated.  Kahane and Schmanske (1997) test the proposition that 
roster turnover has an impact on MLB attendance.  Using data from the 1990 through 1992 MLB seasons and an 
ordinary least squares estimator, they find that turnover does indeed have a significant and negative impact on 
attendance in MLB.  In another study on Major League Baseball attendance, McDonald and Rascher (2000) explore 
the effects that special promotions have on game day attendance.  Using ordinary least squares regression, they find 
that promotions increase game-day attendance by about 14%.  Other studies on demand for baseball attendance 
include Boyd (2003), which also examines the impact of promotions, Rivers and DeSchriver (2002), which 
examines the impact of star players, Schmidt and Berri (2002), which examines the impact of strikes, and Schmidt 
and Berri (2001), which examines how competitive balance influences attendance. 
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There have also been some studies on attendance at basketball games.  Burdekin and Idson (1991) examine 
the effect that customer discrimination has on attendance for the National Basketball Association (NBA).  They find 
that attendance is significantly affected by the racial composition of the team relative to the racial composition of the 
market area. Zhang, Pease, Hui, and Michaud (1995) explore the variables that determine whether or not spectators 
will attend NBA games by developing the Spectator Decision Making Inventory.  Using a survey of a random 
sample of 861 NBA spectators, that they find that game promotion, home team, opposing team, and schedule 
convenience are significantly related to game attendance.  Berri, Schmidt, and Brook (2004) examine the impact of 
star players on NBA attendance, finding that the functional form of the regression equation affects whether or not 
star players have a significant impact on the demand for attendance.   
 
Soccer is another sport that has been relatively well studied.  Peel and Thomas (1988) investigate the 
determinants of attendance for professional soccer in England, hypothesizing that games that are not predicable 
attract bigger crowds.  Using data from the 1981-82 season of the English Football League, they find that economic, 
geographic, and demographic variables play a part in determining attendance at soccer matches.  Baimbridge (1997) 
examines soccer match attendance at the European Championship that was held in England in 1996.  He uses 
ordinary least squares regression and finds that the distance between the team‟s home city and the tournament site 
and the quality of the teams are the most important factors that affect tournament attendance.  Recent studies on 
attendance at soccer matches include Hall (2004), which examines the role that television plays in determining 
attendance, and Szymanski (2001), which examines the relationship between financial parity, competitive balance, 
and attendance at English soccer matches.     
 
As for football, there have been studies done in recent years on the demand for attendance at collegiate as 
well as professional football games.  In their study of NCAA Division II football, DeSchriver and Jensen (2002) 
examine the relationship between attendance at college football games and various economic and game variables. 
Results of the analysis suggest that both the past season and current season winning percentages have an affect on 
attendance, with the past season‟s performance becoming relatively less important than the current season‟s 
performance as the season progresses.  Promotional activities, size of the college, and competition within the market 
were also found to be significant factors in determining attendance at college football games.  A similar study on 
Division I college football was conducted by Price and Sen (2003).  Welki and Zlatoper (1994) examine NFL 
attendance and the factors that affect it. The regression analysis indicates that the home team‟s winning percentage is 
an important factor in determining attendance.  They also suggest that higher ticket prices depress attendance and 
that the demand for professional football appears to be inelastic.   
 
These studies provide a solid foundation for research on NFL attendance, but none of the studies attempt to 
account for habit-formation in their models.  Economic theory regarding the role that habits play in the demand for 
goods is a relatively new subject.  Alfred Marshall initially mentioned the idea in his 1920 textbook.  Marshall notes: 
 
…whether a commodity conforms to the law of diminishing or increasing return, the increase in consumption 
resulting from a fall in price is gradual; and, further, habits which have once grown up around the use of a 
commodity while its price is low are not quickly abandoned when its price rises again. 
 
Recently, attempts have been made to integrate habit-formation with economic theory.  For a 
comprehensive review of addiction literature see Fenn (1998)
 
 and Chaloupka (1988).  This study will focus on 
rational addiction theory as it applies to a demand model for the NFL.  It will rely on the work of Fenn (1998), 
which follows seminal theoretical work by Becker and Murphy (1988) and empirical work by Becker, Grossman, 
and Murphy (1994).   
 
Rational addiction, according to Becker and Murphy (1988), implies that people make choices according to 
their consistent utility maximization plan.  Their theoretical work outlines the demand model for a habit-forming 
good, which includes price, past consumption, and expected future consumption.  Future empirical work by the likes 
of Chaloupka (1991), Grossman (1993), Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1994), and Fenn, Antonovitz, and 
Schroeter (2001) find support for the rational addiction model in the case of goods with known habit-forming 
properties such as cigarettes and alcohol. 
 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – December, 2010 Volume 8, Number 12 
24 
As for sports attendance and habit-formation, there has been limited investigation.  Ahn and Lee (2003) 
attempt to apply elements of the rational addiction model to sports consumption in their examination of baseball 
attendance.  The results of their regression analysis indicate that baseball consumption is indeed habitual, but not 
necessarily addictive in the rational sense (i.e. past consumption influences present consumption but future 
consumption is insignificant).  Byers, Peel, and Thomas (2000) analyze the possibility of rational habit-formation 
among professional soccer fans in England.  The results indicate support for the rational habit-formation model, 
suggesting that habit may be an important factor that influences spectators at professional sporting events. 
 
Another body of literature accounts for habit-formation by including a measure of “fan loyalty” in the 
demand equation.  While these models are not models of rational addiction, they do consider habit as a factor in the 
demand for attendance.  One such example is found in Dobson and Goddard (1995), which examines attendance in 
the English Football League. They employ two-stage least squares (2SLS), where attendance and loyalty are 
endogenous variables, and find that team success, price, and loyalty are significant factors that determine attendance 
at soccer matches in England.   
 
The present study will fuse elements from the body of literature on attendance at sporting events with the 
current research on rational addiction. Following the earlier work done on attendance, this study will examine the 
traditional variables used in predicting spectatorship at sporting events to see how they impact NFL attendance.  
Estimated past and future consumption are added to the model, according to rational addiction theory.  The result 
will be a model that accounts for habit formation in the demand for attendance at NFL games.  The following section 
will outline this model and discuss the data.   
 
MODEL AND DATA 
 
The empirical model will be tested using a pooled data set that has been collected from every team in the 
National Football League for the 1983 through 2008 NFL seasons.  There are a total of 32 NFL teams that play 16 
games each regular season, which does not include pre-season or playoff games.  Due to the requirements of the 
rational addiction model that will be discussed later in this paper, each team used in the data set had to play at least 
three seasons to provide sufficient data for one observation.
2
  This result is a pooled data set comprised of annual 
statistics from thirty-one teams.  There are three expansion teams in this set that will be discussed in the following 
subsection.  The remaining 28 teams existed for all 17 seasons.  This yields a total of 764 observations.  Annual data 
was collected for each team and its respective city.   
 
 Given the pooled dataset, the trade-off we face in using the data to estimate the demand for ticket 
attendance is that we impose a similar preference structure across teams.  Ideally, we would estimate team specific 
demands allowing for divergent fan preferences in the  varying NFL markets.  This is not feasible as we lack enough 
observations to appropriately identify the market specific demand for NFL attendance.  At least, the gains by pooling 
the data allow for us to explore the implications of stadium capacity on demand estimation.  With this said, we do 
control for some individual team effects (as shift factors in the demand) in the instrumental variable regression 
presented below.   
 
 Profit maximization is modeled as follows.  Given that the stadium has fixed capacity in a particular year, 
the team has no marginal cost of a fan attending up to the capacity constraint.  Once the capacity constraint is 
reached, the marginal cost is infinite.  This implies that the team will maximize profits by maximizing ticket revenue 
in a given season (a point that is emphasized below).  Ticket revenue is maximized when the elasticity of demand is 
unit elastic.  Figure 2 indicates the optimal price for tickets given the demand curve D in a stadium with no binding 
capacity constraint.  The price p corresponds to the point on the demand curve where demand is unit elastic.       
 
 
                                                 
2The Houston Texans franchise had to be eliminated from the data set since they were a new expansion team in 2002 and only 
one season of data was available.    
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Figure 2:  Optimal Ticket Price with No Capacity Constraint 
 
 
Teams may adjust the capacity of the stadiums in which they operate between seasons.  As profit 
maximizers, the team will adjust capacity upwards to capture profits.  This suggests that capacity is endogenous 
(many teams adjust stadium capacity throughout our time series).  We can detect capacity constraining profits when 
season attendance for a particular team falls on the elastic portion of the demand curve.  Figure 3 indicates the 
optimal price for tickets given the demand curve D in a stadium with a binding capacity constraint.  Notice that the 
price that maximizes profits is the height of the demand curve where marginal revenue (MR) hits the horizontal axis.  
Yet, the stadium lacks the capacity to admit the number of fans necessary to maximize profits.  So, the team does the 
best it can in the short-run by charging the highest price the market will bear at the capacity constraint.  This is the 
price indicated by p.  In the long-run, the team will choose to add to capacity.  We expect to observe falling ticket 
prices and rising attendance as team bring the extra capacity over time-holding everything else constant.   
 
Mathematically, we are suggesting profits over a season are given by 
 
π=R0+P(att)att-C0,   (1) 
 
where π  is profits, R0 is non-attendance sources of revenue, P(att) is the team's price as a function of expected 
attendance, att is fan attendance, and C0 is total cost.  To maximize profits, the team's first-order condition is 
 
  
    
        ↔
  
    
   
 
    ↔           (2) 
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Figure 3:  Optimal Ticket Price given a Capacity Constraint 
 
 
This suggests that over time we anticipate the own-price elasticity of demand to tend to 1.  If the elasticity 
of demand is less than 1, teams will raise ticket price.  If the elasticity of demand is greater than 1, teams will add to 
capacity and/or lower ticket prices.  This is the structural implication of profit maximization.  Given capacity is 
costly to add over time, team do not desire excessive capacity.   Hence, we anticipate the team's forecast of the 
sensitivity of ticket demand to changes in the price is 
 
   
    
  
  
        
 
  (3) 
 
where Capacity is the stadium capacity for the year.  Profit maximization occurs when ticket demand is exactly at 
capacity, elasticity of demand is unitary, and the team has no costly excessive capacity.   
 
 For our observed data, 75% of our observations have excess capacity below 13.28% (the histogram of 
excess capacity is provided in Figure 4).  This suggests that the variable we have defined as c immediately above 
serves as a useful proxy for the team's forecast of the sensitivity of fans to changes in ticket price.  Furthermore, we 
use this proxy as an independent variable in explaining attendance.  This proxy will be useful in explaining 
attendance because it captures the time dynamic of how team respond optimally to attendance trends by setting 
price.  For example, if price was set too high last period (or the team is constrained by stadium capacity), the own-
price elasticity of demand last period would be larger than 1.  As we have demonstrated above, the profit 
maximizing team would decrease ticket price in the subsequent time period while simultaneously increasing stadium 
capacity.  If price was set too low last period, the own-price elasticity of demand would be smaller than 1.  The 
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profit maximizing team would increase ticket price in this setting.  The failure to account for this dynamic pricing 
interaction between fans and teams over time may be one reason past studies have found ticket prices to be 
insignificant or positively related to attendance.  
 
 
Figure 4:  Histogram of xCap  
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 As some teams play in stadiums with excess capacity, the ratio of stadium capacity to ticket price fails to 
serve a useful proxy for c, defined above.  To identify when this occurs, we define a dummy variable, TOOBIG, to 
take on the value 1 when excess capacity is over 5%.  Next, we define the lagged Elasticity of Demand as 
 
      
    
      
 . (4)   
 
We then create the interaction variable             .  So, if c is serving as a useful proxy, we use the 
own-price elasticity of demand to capture the price interaction between fans and teams.  If, on the other hand, c is 
not serving as a useful proxy, we capture the demand implications in the coefficient on the TOOBIG dummy.  We 
anticipate that the estimated coefficient on the interaction variable will be positive, reflecting the optimal 
price/capacity response of the team to last periods own-price elasticity of demand.  The basic empirical model is 
displayed in equation 5. 
 
                                                                      (5) 
 
Table 1 provides a brief description of each of the variables in the regression equation, along with the mean 
and standard deviation of each of the variables.   
 
 
Table 1:  Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Description Mean 
attt Total annual attendance for each NFL team from the NFL Record and Fact Book 489968 
Ed Own-price elasticity of Demand 1.11 
Pt Weighted average annual ticket price for each team each year 38.55 
WINPCTt Team winning percentage for each season 0.50 
TOOBIGt A dummy variable indicating if the team has more than 5% excess stadium capacity 0.41 
 
 
 
 
xCap 
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There are two key complications with estimating equation (5) using ordinary least squares.  First, the future 
value of attendance is included as a explanatory variable.  Second, as we explain below, ticket demand is actually 
right-tail censored.  This is because we only observe ticket demand when ticket demand is less than or equal to 
stadium capacity.   
 
 Given future attendance is stochastic and correlated with the current stochastic portion of attendance et, the 
exogeneity condition for ordinary least squares is violated.  To overcome this violation, we use an instrumental 
variables approach to first forecast future attendance with non-stochastic instruments.  Once this is done, we use the 
forecasted future attendance in place of future attendance in equation 5.  The instrumental variables regression for 
future attendance is: 
 
                                                                           
                                                                     
                                                                         
                                                                            
                                                                         
                                                                        
                             (6) 
 
The instrument variables, included as explanatory variables for future attendance, are defined below in the 
independent variables and dummy variables sections. 
 
 The issue of truncated ticket demand is discussed and treated in the section on Tobit estimation later on in 
the paper.  The truncation requires the adoption of a maximum likelihood estimation technique to recover the model 
parameters of interest.   
 
Relocation and Expansion Teams 
 
 Some of the teams included in the data set are expansion teams that entered the league at some point during 
the 1983 through 2008 period.  Both the Carolina Panthers and the Jacksonville Jaguars entered the NFL in 1995.  
Also, the Cleveland Browns left Cleveland to become the Baltimore Ravens in 1996.  Then, in 1999, Cleveland was 
granted an expansion team, still called the Browns, to replace the Browns that had left town three years before.  
These three teams are the only examples of expansion teams that entered the league during the time period that is 
being studied.  Since the data is broken down by team and by year, the fact that these teams did not exist for the 
entire data set was not problematic econometrically.  The expansion teams were simply included in the data set as 
any other team, except for the fact that significantly fewer observations were available for these three teams.   
 
 There were also a number of teams that relocated during the time period of interest.  The Oakland Raiders, 
who began playing in Oakland in 1970, relocated to Los Angeles in 1982.  The franchise then packed up and moved 
back to Oakland in 1995.  Also, the Titans that now play in Tennessee called Houston home from 1970 through 
1996.  The Rams have been playing in St. Louis since 1995, after they followed the Raiders lead and left the City of 
Angels.  Also, as previously discussed, the Ravens that now play in Baltimore were the Cleveland Browns until 
1996.  In calculating the demographic variables such as income and city-specific variables such as number of 
professional teams, great care had to be taken to ensure that the information was being calculated for the correct 
cities when teams relocated. 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
The dependent variable, attt from equation 5, in the empirical model will be attendance.  This is measured 
for each NFL team for each season as total paid attendance.  The data was collected from the NFL Record and Fact 
Book, published for every season from 1983 through 2008.
3
   
                                                 
3A special thank you is owed to Kenn Tomasch, Rod Fort, and Alexander Hinojos for their work to help ensure the integrity and 
accuracy of this data set. 
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Independent Variables 
 
The independent variables that will be used are mostly team-specific variables.  The first team-specific 
explanatory variable is ticket price, Pt from equations 3 and 4, which is defined as the average ticket price for each 
team for each year.  The ticket price used is a weighted average, attained by accounting for the number of seats at 
each specific ticket price in calculating the average price for each team in a given year.  This data was also collected 
from Rod Fort‟s Sports Business Data Pages and then deflated by the Consumer Price Index to generate real prices.4  
Ticket price, according to the law of demand, should be negatively related to the quantity demanded of NFL games. 
Depending upon the elasticity of demand for the good, demand may be more or less sensitive to changes in price, 
but price is expected to have some negative impact.  As described above, we anticipate observing the price effect in 
coefficient b3 from equation (5). 
 
The next explanatory variable is winning percentage, WINPCTt in equation 5, which is the winning 
percentage of each team for each season included in the data set.  This is calculated by dividing the total number of 
regular season wins by the total number of regular season games.  In the event of a tie, which is a possibility in the 
NFL, each team was given one-half of a win.  Winning percentage was calculated using statistics from Total football 
II: The encyclopedia of the national football league.  According to past studies, such as Welki and Zlatoper (1994), 
DeSchriver and Jensen (2002), and Price and Sen (2003), winning percentage is expected to have a positive effect on 
attendance.  It seems that winning teams tend to create greater interest and draw in bigger crowds in most cases. 
 
 The variables TOOBIGt and Ed are defined in the previous section.  TOOBIGt is a dummy variable that 
indicates when a team has more than 5% in excess stadium capacity.  We include this variable in the model as it 
indicates when the ratio of stadium capacity to ticket price serves as a useful proxy for the sensitivity of demand for 
tickets to changes in ticket price.  When TOOBIGt takes on the value of 1, the ratio of stadium capacity to ticket 
price will fail to proxy the sensitivity of demand for tickets to ticket price as detailed above.  Ed is the lagged value 
of own-price elasticity of demand.  As we suggest above, this variable will be accurately measured when excess 
capacity is small or 0 given NFL teams are profit maximizers.  Notice that equation (5) includes the interaction of 
(1-TOOBIGt) and Ed.  Thus, the coefficient b3 only measures the price effect when we anticipate Ed to be reasonably 
measured.  The coefficient b4 will capture the implications for attendance when Ed is not reasonably measured.   
 
Stadium age, stadaget in equation 1, is another variable that appears on the right-hand side of the regression 
equation.  This is the age, in years, of the facility in which each NFL team plays in any given season.  When a new 
stadium is built or an old stadium is significantly renovated, the stadium age variable will have the value of one for 
the first season during which the stadium is used.  The stadium age variable will take on a value of two in the 
following season, three in the next, and so on until the team moves to a new stadium or the old one is substantially 
renovated.  Then, the variable starts over at one.  These ages were calculated using information from the NFL 
Record and Fact Books.  The age of the facility in which the team plays is expected to impact the demand for 
attendance negatively.  Previous studies, such as Howard and Cromton (2003) and Kahane and Schmanske (1997), 
have explored the stadium novelty effect, finding that newer stadiums tend to boost attendance.  Empirical evidence 
suggests that although the novelty effect loses much of its power after the first year or two with attendances often 
falling in subsequent years, the overall impact is still seen for many years afterward since attendances rarely drop 
below the figures seen before the stadium was built.  Thus, older stadiums are expected to be associated with lower 
attendance figures.   
 
Income, displayed as incomet in equation 1, is also a variable that is used to explain attendance.  In the 
empirical model, per capita income for the Metropolitan Statistical Area is used.  These data were obtained from the 
website of the Bureau of Economic Analysis and are also adjusted for inflation by dividing the series by the 
Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers series whose base year is 1983.  As was noted in a previous sub-
section, certain NFL teams have not played in the same city each year.  Care had to be taken in matching the correct 
Metropolitan Statistical Area with the correct team for each season.  Per capita income figures were gathered for the 
city in which the team played in any given season, even when it was not the same city that hosted the team the 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
4The Consumer Price Index was taken from the U.S. Department of Labor.  All values were calculated in terms of 1983 dollars.   
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previous season.  Income is an important factor in the demand for any good, with higher income causing increased 
consumption for normal goods.  However, it is unclear whether or not professional sporting events are normal goods 
with some studies, such as Noll (1974) and Welki and Zlatoper (1994), finding the impact of increased income to be 
negative or insignificant.  Therefore, the expected sign and perhaps the significance of the income coefficient are 
uncertain.     
 
The number of professional sports teams in each city that houses an NFL team was also expected to have 
some impact on the attendance of professional football games in that city.    Therefore, the total number of 
professional football, basketball, hockey, and baseball teams that are in an NFL city is included as an explanatory 
variable.  This variable is named numprotmst in equation 1.  It was constructed using team information that is 
included on each league‟s website.  The number of other professional sports teams in the city could have a negative 
impact on attendance, since they could be seen as substitutes for NFL teams.  Noll (1974) found this to be the case 
for professional baseball.  However, the other teams could also be viewed as complementary goods and could thus 
increase the demand for NFL attendance.  The sign of this variable is ambiguous.    
 
The number of marquis players on a team is included as a variable that may have an effect on the 
attendance for that team and is shown as allstarst in equation 1.  The number of players that a team sends to the Pro 
Bowl in a given season is used as a proxy for such talent.  Pro Bowl rosters for each year were found at pro-football-
reference.com.  The number of Pro Bowl players is expected to have a positive impact on attendance, since big-
name superstars often attract crowds.  However, Rivers and DeSchriver (2002) found that star players only seemed 
to increase attendance at Major League Baseball games when their presence on the team was accompanied by an 
improvement in team performance.  It is unclear whether or not this variable will be significant.   
 
Dummy Variables 
 
 In addition to the TOOBIG dummy defined and discussed above, we allow for team specific and year 
dummy variables.  The team specific dummy variables include DAZ, DAT, DBUF, DCAR, DCHIC, DCIN, DDAL, 
DDEN, DDET, DGB, DOILTITAN, DINDY, DJACK, DLARAMS, DMIAMI, DMIN, DNE, DNO, DGNTS, 
DNYJTS, DOAK, DPHILLY, DPIT, DSD, DSF, DSEA, and DTB.  These variables correspond to Arizona, Atlanta, 
Buffalo, Carolina, Chicago, Cincinnati, Dallas, Denver, Detroit, Green Bay, Tennessee, Indianapolis, Jacksonville, 
St. Louis, Miami, Minnesota, New England, New Orleans, New York Giants, New York Jets, Oakland, 
Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, and Tampa Bay.  We also include the year specific 
dummy variables X83, X84, X85, X86, X87, X88, X89, X89, X90, X91, X92, X93, X94, X95, X96, X97, X98, 
X99, X00, X01, X02, X03, X04, X05, X06, X07 and X08.  These year dummy variables correspond to data from the 
years 1983 through 2008, respectively.   The signs of the coefficients on the dummy variables are unknown and are 
expected to vary across teams and over time. 
 
Past and Future Attendance 
 
Recall that appearing on the right-hand side of regression equation 5 are past and future attendance 
variables, attt-1and attt+1, respectively.  According to rational addiction theory, past and expected future consumption 
have an impact on present consumption for habit-forming goods.  Thus, if the NFL is indeed habit-forming, then the 
coefficients associated with past and future attendance should be positive and significant.  A complete derivation of 
the demand function for a „good‟ with habit-forming properties can be found in the Appendix, providing 
justification for the inclusion of past and future attendance in the regression model.   
 
Estimation Procedures 
 
To estimate the demand for NFL attendance, fixed-effects two-stage least squares (FE2SLS) will be 
employed.  This estimation procedure was chosen due to the fact that actual figures for past and future attendance 
attt-1and attt+1, respectively, are endogenous in the regression equation because they would each depend on present 
attendance according to the model.  The method of FE2SLS involves using instrumental variables to run a first stage 
regression with future attendance as the dependent variable.  This regression corresponds to equation (6) above.  The 
predicted values obtained from this first stage regression for future attendance is then used in the second stage as an 
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independent variable to explain the current period‟s attendance, attt in equation 5.  Using the predicted values 
instead of actual values remedies the econometric problems associated with having independent variables that are 
correlated with the error term.  The instrumental variables that were used in the first stage of regressions are 
presented in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2:  Two-Stage Least Squares Instrumental Variables and Definitions 
Variable Name Description 
Capacity Stadium capacity for the current season. 
ALLSTARS The number of All-Stars on the team's roster for the current season. 
winpctt Team winning percentage for the current season 
NUMPROTMS The number of promotional events sponsored during home games throughout the current season. 
stadaget Age of the facility in which the team played in for the current season 
incomet Annual per capita metropolitan statistical area income for the previous year 
D Team specific dummy variables. 
X Year specific dummy variables. 
 
 
REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
Table 3 summarizes the results of the regression analyses from the instrumental variable model that was 
estimated to predict future attendance.  The coefficients and t-statistics on team specific and annual time dummies 
have not been reported in order to save space.  With the predicted future attendance variable formed, we may now 
estimate equation 6.  To do so requires a formal treatment of the censored ticket demand.  This is the goal of the next 
section. 
   
 
Table 3:  Instrument Variable Predictions of Future Attendance 
Variable Coefficient T-value 
(Intercept) 229500 4.292 
Capacity 0.5109 9.928 
STADAGE -972.6 -4.251 
Income -0.4482 -0.45 
ALLSTARS 3462 3.905 
NUMPROTMS -439.9 -0.17 
 
 
ESTIMATION OF CENSORED ATTENDANCE MODEL 
 
As detailed above, we use an instrumental variables approach to forecast the future value of attendance.  
The results of this instrumental regression are presented in Table 3.  With this forecast of future attendance, we 
model: 
 
att t = b0 + b1attt-1 + b2 fattt+1 + b3 Ed,t-1 (1-TOOBIGt)+ b4 TOOBIGt + b5 WINPCTt + et,  (7) 
 
where fatt t+1 is the forecast of attendance in period t+1 given information available at time t, and e t is a stochastic 
noise term that captures non-systematic variations in attendance.  Now, given the potential for binding capacity 
constraints, we will not always observe the quantity of tickets demanded.  That is, we actually only observe (Tobin): 
 
att
*
t = 
                  
                      
 (8) 
 
We define                                                                             (9) 
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This allows us to state the maximum likelihood function as 
 
                                             ,   (10) 
 
where F is the cumulative density function of a standard normal and f(:) is the probability density function of a 
conditional standard normal random variable. 
 
Estimation results of the TOBIT model are presented in Table 4.  The independent variables have the 
theoretically expected sign and are statistically significant at any reasonable level of tolerance.  In particular, it 
appears that the dynamic interaction between fans and teams is being captured by the parameter on the lagged 
Elasticity of Demand.  That is, teams that do not have excess capacity tend to follow periods of constrained ticket 
demand by lowering ticket price and adding to stadium capacity.  When Elasticity of Demand is less than 1, teams 
tend not to add to stadium capacity and increase ticket prices. 
 
 
Table 4:  Tobit Estimates of Equation 7 
Variable Estimate T-statistic 
(Intercept) 0 NA 
I(100 * I_tooBig) -394.41299 -4.331 
I(100 * Ed) 283.61242 2.989 
ATT t+1 0.25791 6.864 
ATT t-1 0.79235 24.955 
WINPCT 26.02362 3.11 
Log(scale) 10.09671 213.369 
 
 
As expected, the coefficients on past ATT t-1 and future attendance ATT t+1 are positive and significant.  Past 
attendance contributes 0.79 on current attendance while expected future attendance contributes 0.26 on current 
attendance.  This is consistent with rational addiction theory, which supports the notion that NFL fans display 
characteristics of rational addiction.  This implies that as past and expected future attendance rise, attendance in the 
current season rises as well. 
 
 The coefficient for the team‟s winning percentage is also positive and significant.  This is in accordance 
other research, since nearly all studies that examine the demand for attendance at professional sporting events 
include some measure of team performance in the equation, which is usually found to positively affect attendance.  
Welki and Zlatoper (1994) find that the home team record is a significant factor in determining game day 
attendance. Berri, Schmidt, and Brook (2004) also find that team performance is an important factor in determining 
attendance with wins, playoff wins, and championships all turning out to be significant and positive in their analysis 
of attendance at NBA games.  This suggests that a team that wins more games tends to attract more fans.   
 
 Model results also suggest that teams operating with greater than 5% excessive capacity tend to experience 
a reduction in attendance of 39,441 fans per season.  This is because teams with excessive capacity beyond 5% will 
absorb the coefficient on TOOBIG.  While we anticipate that teams in this situation maximizing profits are still 
operating around unitary elasticity of demand, we cannot accurately measure this elasticity of demand by using 
stadium capacity.   
 
 Teams with excessive capacity below 5% allow us to accurately proxy the elasticity of demand and the 
teams interaction with fans through pricing.  Our model results suggest that a 1% rise in the previous year's own-
price elasticity of demand results in 283.61 more fan attendance in the current year.  Again, this is consistent with 
team profit maximizing behavior.  A large elasticity of demand in the previous year signals the team experienced a 
stadium capacity constraint or inadvertently charged too high a price to maximize profits.  Thus, we anticipate the 
team will reduce real ticket prices and/or expand stadium capacity in the current year to increase profits.  The 
corollary is that a 1% decline in the previous year's own-price elasticity of demand results in 283.61 fewer fans in 
the current year.  This is because if own-price elasticity is below 1 the previous year, the profit maximizing team will 
raise ticket prices and increase profits.  This higher price results in fewer ticket sales holding everything else 
constant. 
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 The variable log(Scale) refers to the dependent variable's estimated standard error.  We directly measure 
this parameter in the maximum likelihood setting.  This suggests a standard error in our ticket demand model of 
24,343 tickets for a season.  We anticipate that 95% of the time a team's actual season ticket demand will be within 
97,372 of our fitted model estimate. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study has attempted to answer questions about attendance at National Football League games by 
estimating the demand for tickets to these games and examining fan behavior.  In the past, rational addiction theory, 
pioneered by Becker and Murphy (1988), has been used to explain the demand for habit-forming goods.  Rational 
addiction theory suggests that people make choices according to their consistent utility maximization plan, implying 
that past and expected future consumption of a habit-forming good would likely impact the present consumption of 
that good for addicted consumers.  The purpose of this paper was to test for characteristics of rational addiction 
among fans of the National Football League.   
 
While there have been many studies that have attempted to explain attendance at various sporting events, 
there have been relatively few attendance studies that have examined the NFL.  There have also been a number of 
studies that have tested rational addiction theory, but none of them have examined this theory in the context of 
professional football.  This paper has summarized the main findings of previous research and extended it by 
combining the theories found in the two bodies of literature. 
 
Previous work on attendance provides various models with many variables that have been hypothesized to 
have an impact on attendance at professional sporting events.  These variables include, but are not limited to, team-
specific variables, such as winning percentage and the number of marquis players on a given team‟s roster, and 
league-specific variables, such as the incidence of strikes and measures of competitive balance.  Also, key economic 
demand determinants, such as ticket price and income, are included in traditional attendance demand models.  The 
innovation of this research is the inclusion of past and future attendance in the demand equation.  This comes from 
the derivation of the demand curve for habit-forming goods that is outlined in detail in the appendix.  Testing for 
significance of these two variables in the demand function explores the possibility of habit-formation among the 
consumers who are, in this case, NFL fans. 
 
To test the rational addiction model empirically, data were collected for the 1985 through 2002 NFL 
seasons.  The data set is a pooled set comprised of statistics from each NFL team for each season that is played 
during the period included in the study.  The results are very consistent among the models, showing the same 
variables to be significant with uniformity in the signs and magnitudes of coefficients.  Past and future attendance, 
winning percentage, stadium age, and strike years were found to be significant factors in explaining attendance at 
NFL games.  These findings are consistent with the theory.  However, there are some caveats that merit discussion. 
 
First of all, NFL games sell out on a regular basis, which creates econometric difficulties when one is trying 
to estimate demand.  A simultaneous Tobit estimation might be more appropriate with the truncated dependent 
variable.  Also, to better test for habit formation, it would be beneficial to know whether or not the same people are 
attending games.  Such data are not available for attendance at NFL games due to the lack of panel data.  These 
problems motivate the suggestions for future research. 
 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
It would be interesting to employ the rational addiction model to test television viewership in the NFL, 
using data from Nielsen ratings to test for habit-formation among fans that watch professional football from their 
own homes.  This would remedy the problem that excess attendance demand may cause, since there is not a fixed 
stadium capacity when it comes to television broadcasts.  The excess demand, evidenced by sellouts, causes a 
truncated dependent variable.  This can cause econometric problems if the model is not estimated correctly.  The 
econometric problems that arise from improper estimation include nonsensical predicted values, biased regression 
coefficients, error terms that are not normally distributed, and heteroscedasticity.      
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Another benefit of using Nielsen ratings is that viewership could be tracked to see if it is indeed the same 
households that are tuning in game after game, which would provide more compelling evidence for habit-formation.  
Furthermore, the utility function in the optimization problem is assumed to be quadratic.  This does not model 
rational addicts correctly since it implies that if there is any deviation from the steady state of consumption, the 
addict will either quit consuming altogether or increase consumption infinitely.  This is not the case according to 
rational addiction theory, which suggests that there are actually several steady states of consumption to which 
addicts can move.  Using a Cobb-Douglas function or some other functional form would provide innovation in 
rational addiction literature.  However, using these functions in the optimization problem may make it impossible to 
solve.  These are simply suggestions to keep in mind for further research that is beyond the scope of the current 
study.      
 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
This research provides some insights into the habit-formation aspects of the demand for NFL football that 
have not been included in earlier studies.  Calculating the elasticity of demand with respect to winning percentage 
provides one interesting insight.  When these elasticities are calculated, the impact of winning percentage on 
attendance is not found to be as significant as one might expect.  Using the basic linear FE2SLS regression model, 
the elasticity of demand with respect to winning percentage for the entire league was found to be 0.03.  Also, the 
sample was broken down by team for Denver, Cincinnati, Tampa Bay, and Dallas and the elasticities were calculated 
for the individual teams.  Again, the elasticity of demand with respect was found to be approximately 0.03 for each 
one of the teams for which it was calculated.  This implies that for every one percent increase in winning percentage, 
attendance increases by 0.03 percent.  For the four teams tested, a rise in attendance of that magnitude translates into 
between 12,700 and 17,500 more fans attending games in a given year.   
 
This study has some important implications, especially for those that set ticket prices for the NFL.  
Researchers in the field of sports economics have been puzzled by the fact that analyses of attendance demand at 
professional sporting events consistently find that tickets for games are priced in the elastic range of the demand 
curve.  This is contradictory to microeconomic theories that state that optimal prices, which are those that maximize 
profits, are set in the inelastic portion of the demand curve.  Estimates of price elasticity in studies by Noll (1974) 
and Fort (2003) suggest that prices are not set at this optimal point.  Allowing for habit-formation provides a 
possible explanation for this puzzling phenomenon.  Owners may be aware of the effect that habitual behavior has 
on demand and they may price tickets accordingly, hoping to increase current attendance in order to increase their 
future profits by getting more people “hooked” on the sport.  This study supports such a notion and suggests that by 
continuing to price in the elastic portion of the demand curve, the NFL can hope to increase the demand for 
attendance at their games in the long run.          
 
In conclusion, this study provides support for the rational addiction model for the consumption behavior of 
NFL fans.  The results suggest that the consumption of NFL games, at least in attendance at NFL games, is indeed 
habit forming.  This study provides a starting point for the examination of habit-formation in professional sports.   
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APPENDIX 
 
The purpose of this Appendix is to derive the demand function for an addictive good.  This will follow the 
derivation that was already outlined but will go over the details that were not included in the text. 
 
The derivation depends on the assumed utility function for a rational agent and the equation for the 
addictive stock that a habit-forming good accumulates. 
 
Utility Function:  
 
),,,( ttttt eACYUU                                                   (a.1) 
 
Addictive Stock:  
 
11 )1()1(   ttt ACA                                               (a.2) 
 
It is assumed that the rate of decay of the addictive stock is 100%, which implies that  is equal to one in 
the coefficient of the At-1 term.  This leaves the following equation for the addictive stock constraint:  
 
1)1(  tt CA                                                             (a.3) 
 
Now, the addictive stock constraint can be substituted into the utility function, leaving a function that 
represents utility in terms of consumption of the addictive good and consumption of all other goods:  
 
),)1(,,( 1 ttttt eCCYUU                                                   (a.4) 
 
Assuming that an agent lives to time T and discounts their utility according to the market rate of interest, r, 
lifetime utility, U, can be represented as follows, where β represents the discount factor 
r1
1
: 
 
),)1(,,( 1
1
1
tttt
t
T
t
eCCYU 


                                             (a.5) 
 
The lifetime budget constraint is represented as follows, where W represents the present value of lifetime 
wealth, Yt is the numeraire good, Pt is the price of the addictive good in time t and Ct is the quantity consumed of the 
addictive good in time t and β is again the consumer‟s discount factor 
r1
1
: 
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Solving for First Order Conditions 
 
The objective is to maximize lifetime utility, U, subject to the budget constraint, W.  It is necessary to set 
up a simple Lagrangian optimization problem, as follows: 
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The first step is to take a partial derivative of equation a.7 with respect to Yt and set it equal to zero, 
yielding the following: 
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Upon simplification, the following first order condition is obtained: 
  
   ),)1(,,( 1 ttttY eCCYU t                                           (a.9) 
 
The next step involves taking the partial derivative of equation a.7 with respect to Ct and setting it equal to 
zero.  However, the Lagrangian problem from equation a.7 must be expanded due to the fact that the variable of 
interest, Ct, is present in the summation not only at time t, but also at time t + 1.  This makes it necessary to have 
four separate terms in the Lagrangian equation for four distinct scenarios.  A term is needed for time 1 to t – 1, plus 
a term for time t, another term for time t +1, and a final term for time t + 2 to T in order to explain the four 
possibilities and isolate the scenarios at time t and time    t + 1, which will be the times that Ct remains in the 
equation.  The resulting Lagrangian is presented in equation a.10: 
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The partial derivative with respect to Ct can now be taken, producing the following equation, which has 
been set equal to zero:             
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Some simplification yields the following, which is the second of the first order conditions: 
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Deriving the Demand Function 
 
In keeping with Becker et al. (1994)
5
 and Fenn (1998),
6
 the utility function is assumed to be quadratic in 
the current period‟s consumption of the addictive good, the composite good, the addictive stock, and the other 
                                                 
5 Gary Becker, Michael Grossman, and Kevin Murphy, “An Empirical Analysis of Cigarette Addiction,” The American 
Economic Review, Volume 84, Number 3, 1994: 396-418.    
 
6 Aju Fenn, “The impact of addiction information on cigarette consumption,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Iowa State University, 1998. 
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unobservable events that impact utility.  These variables are denoted by Ct, Yt, At, and et, respectively.  Just as 
before, a substitution is made for At, according to the addictive stock constraint from equation a.3.  The result is the 
following utility function, first outlined in Becker and Murphy (1988): 
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Taking the partial derivative of the exact utility function in equation a.13 with respect to Y t and setting it 
equal to λ produces the exact form of the first order condition, given in equation a.14: 
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Now, equation a.14 can be solved for Yt: 
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Similarly, taking the partial derivative of the exact utility function with respect to Ct, and setting it equal to 
λ can obtain the exact form of the second of the first order conditions.   
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Next, equation a.15 will be used to substitute for Yt and Yt+1 in equation a.16 in order to get the marginal 
utility function for the addictive good completely in terms of Ct and exogenous variables: 
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Now, the function can be solved for Ct: 
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In the left-hand side of the equation, Ct can be factored out.  Let the remaining pieces be equal to Ω 
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Both sides of the equation will then be divided by Ω, leaving Ct alone on the left-hand side.  The remaining 
terms on the right-hand side can now be reduced and terms can be collected to find coefficients for the intercept, Ct-
1, Ct+1, Pt, et, and et+1: 
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The demand equation for the addictive good, Ct, can easily be seen if the terms that make up the 
coefficients are renamed as α terms: 
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Thus, the demand equation is as follows: 
 
154312110   tttttt eePCCC                        (a.28) 
 
Notice that the current period‟s price is included in the demand for the addictive good, as well as past and 
expected future consumption of the good.  This is the key to the rational addiction model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – December, 2010 Volume 8, Number 12 
42 
NOTES 
